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When investing in corporate social responsibility (CSR), managersmay strive for a win-win
scenario where all stakeholders end up better off, but they may not always be able to
avoid trading off stakeholders’ interests. To provide guidance to managers who have to
make tradeoffs, this study used a vignette-based experiment to explore stakeholders’
intention to associate with a firm (i.e., buy from or become an employee) that trades
off CSR directed at the stakeholders’ own group (self-directed CSR) and CSR directed
at another stakeholder group (other-directed CSR). Results show that stakeholders
were not systematically more attracted to a firm that favors their own group over
another stakeholder group. Specifically, stakeholders’ other-orientation moderated their
reaction to tradeoffs: stakeholders higher on other-orientation were willing to forego some
material benefits to associate with a firm that treated suppliers in developing countries
significantly better than its competitors, whereas stakeholders lower on other-orientation
were more attracted to a firm favoring their own stakeholder group. Other-orientation
also moderated reactions to tradeoffs involving the environment, although high CSR
directed at the environment did not compensate for low self-directed CSR even for
stakeholders higher on other-orientation. Second, the vignette study showed that trust
mediated the relationship between tradeoffs and stakeholders’ reactions. The study
contributes first and foremost to the burgeoning literature on CSR tradeoffs and to the
multimotive approach to CSR, which claims that other motives can drive stakeholders’
reactions to CSR in addition to self-interest. First, it provides further evidence that
studying CSR tradeoffs is important to understand both (prospective) employees’ and
customers’ reactions to CSR-related activities. Second, it identifies other-orientation as a
motive-related individual difference that explains heterogeneity in stakeholders’ reactions
to CSR. These findings suggest several avenues for future research for organizational
psychologists interested in organizational justice. Third, it investigates trust as amediating
mechanism. Fourth, it reveals differences in stakeholders’ reactions depending on which
other stakeholder group is involved in the tradeoff. For practice, the findings suggest that
tradeoffs are important because they influence which stakeholders are attracted to the
firm.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, tradeoffs, micro-CSR, other-orientation,
prospective employees, consumers, microfoundations
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INTRODUCTION
Engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a way to
attract stakeholders and strengthen existing stakeholder-firm
relationships (Turban and Greening, 1996; Sen et al., 2006;
Barnett, 2007). Yet, in developing responsible strategies and
operating practices to manage relationships with and impacts
on stakeholders and the natural environment (Waddock, 2004,
pp. 9–10), even a firm that strives to find new and innovative
ways to do good for all stakeholders “often has to choose one
[stakeholder] at the expense of another” (Rupp et al., 2006, p.
541) in the shorter term. For example, heavy investing in fair
trade practices to improve the welfare of suppliers in developing
countries can hurt customers’ material well-being, as customers
may have to pay higher prices for the firm’s products or the
firm cannot invest as much in product innovation (White et al.,
2012). Whereas scholars have long recognized that managers
often have to trade off stakeholders’ interests (e.g., Phillips, 2003;
Reynolds et al., 2006), research does not provide guidance on how
to manage tradeoffs (Laplume et al., 2008). In fact, very little is
known about how stakeholders react to the tradeoffs firms make
(Vlachos et al., 2014).
To address this gap, this paper aims to shed light on primary
stakeholders’ intention to associate with a firm (e.g., the intention
to join the firm for prospective employees and to buy from the
firm for customers) when the firm invests more or less in CSR
toward the stakeholders’ own group (“self-directed” CSR) than
it invests in CSR toward another stakeholder group (“other-
directed” CSR). Primary stakeholders, like employees, customers,
suppliers, and investors, supply resources important to firm
performance and associate voluntarily with the firm (Post et al.,
2002, p. 19), which implies that attracting these stakeholders is
critical to firm performance (Clarkson, 1995).
To examine primary stakeholders’ reactions to tradeoffs
between self- and other-directed CSR, we build on Rupp
and colleagues’ multimotive framework that aims to explain
stakeholders’ reactions to other-directed CSR (Rupp et al.,
2006, 2011, 2013; Aguilera et al., 2007; Rupp, 2011). Rupp
and colleagues proposed conceptualizing other-directed CSR
as a special form of third-party justice and have used the
organizational justice literature to develop theory (Rupp et al.,
2006, 2013; Rupp, 2011) and empirically test (Rupp et al., 2013)
whether uncertainty reduction, relational, and moral motives
drive stakeholders’ reactions to other-directed CSR. Building on
this framework we propose that other-orientation moderates
stakeholders’ intention to associate with a firm that trades off
self- and other-directed CSR because individuals higher on this
personality trait are likely to be driven by relational and moral
motives in addition to material self-interest, which is often the
only motive considered by the management literature adopting
the logic of economics (e.g., agency theory; Bosse and Phillips,
Forthcoming).
In addition, we test trust as a mechanism mediating the
relationship between tradeoffs and firm’s attractiveness to
stakeholders. We propose that stakeholders’ trust in the firm
is a manifestation of stakeholders’ expectations that the firm
can fulfill the material, relational, and moral needs identified
by Rupp and colleagues. Finally, we test whether other-
orientation moderates the mediating effect of trust. We expect
this moderating effect because, compared to individuals lower
on other-orientation who are focused on material well-being,
the relational and moral needs of stakeholders higher on
other-orientation make them more vulnerable to managers’
unfair behavior toward stakeholders. We use a vignette-based
experiment to test our hypotheses.
Our work contributes to the micro-CSR, management, and
organizational justice literatures (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Glavas
and Piderit, 2009; Jones, 2010; Jones et al., 2014) in several
ways. First, it provides further empirical support for the recent
claim that studying CSR tradeoffs is important (e.g., Vlachos
et al., 2009, 2014; Auger et al., 2013; Rupp et al., 2013). Second,
and more importantly, by proposing other-orientation as a
source of heterogeneity in stakeholders’ responses to tradeoffs,
our work, on the one hand, provides additional evidence
that the management literature should not focus exclusively
on material self-interest to explain human behavior and, on
the other hand, identifies a boundary condition moderating
stakeholders’ reactions to CSR. For the organizational justice
literature, these findings add to the body of evidence supporting
the use of the relational model (Tyler and Lind, 1992) and
deontic model of organizational justice (Folger, 2001; Folger
et al., 2005) in addition to the instrumental model (Thibaut and
Walker, 1975). In addition, they suggests that the relational and
deontic models of justice may be more useful to understand
the reactions to organizational justice of some individuals than
of others. Third, by studying the mediating effect of trust
we add to knowledge about the mechanisms through which
CSR can affect stakeholders’ attitude and behavior toward the
firm (e.g., Farooq et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014). Fourth, by
considering CSR directed at the environment and CSR directed
at suppliers in developing countries separately, our study reveals
differences in stakeholders’ reactions to tradeoffs according to
which other stakeholder group is involved, suggesting that to
explain stakeholders’ reactions to other-directed CSR we need a
finer-grained understanding of which other stakeholder groups
matter to primary stakeholders of organizations. Our work
suggests several avenues for future research for organizational
psychologists interested in organizational justice.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A Multimotive Framework to Explain
Stakeholders’ Reactions to Tradeoffs
It is well-established in the literature that stakeholders react
to the firm’s (ir)responsible practices toward other stakeholder
groups as well as toward their own group (Rupp et al., 2006,
2013). For example, CSR directed at external stakeholders as well
as employees influence employees’ organizational commitment
and prospective employees’ job pursuit intention (Turban and
Greening, 1996; Rupp et al., 2013; Glavas and Kelley, 2014;
Rayton et al., 2015). The literature also shows that firms
often have to trade off different stakeholders’ interests (Phillips,
2003; Reynolds et al., 2006; Rupp et al., 2006). Yet, how
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these stakeholders react to tradeoffs between self- and other-
directed CSR is unclear. The few empirical studies contrasting
self- and other-directed CSR show mixed results (Peloza and
Shang, 2011). Auger et al. (2003, 2008) found consumers to be
unwilling to sacrifice minimum product quality standards in
favor of socially responsible investments targeted at employees
or the environment. In contrast, in Folkes and Kamins’ (1999)
and Handelman and Arnold’s (1999) studies, high investments
targeted at consumers could not fully compensate for low CSR
investments directed at other stakeholder groups.
These mixed results suggest that the value stakeholders
derive from other-directed CSR may not be entirely related to
personal material benefits. Therefore, we build on Rupp and
colleagues’ multimotive CSR framework (Rupp et al., 2006, 2011,
2013; Aguilera et al., 2007; Rupp, 2011) to better understand
the motives and mechanisms driving stakeholders’ responses
to tradeoffs between self- and other-directed CSR. Rupp and
colleagues propose conceptualizing other-directed CSR as third-
party justice and argue that three motives drive (prospective)
employees’ reactions to other-directed CSR: an uncertainty
reduction motive, a relational motive, and a moral motive. First,
(prospective) employees may value other-directed CSR because
it provides a heuristic to forecast how the firm will treat its
employees in the future and, thus, offers a sense of control
over their own material outcomes (e.g., Rupp et al., 2006, 2013;
Aguilera et al., 2007; Farooq et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014).
Second, (prospective) employees may value other-directed CSR
because it fulfills their need for relating to others inside and
outside the firm (e.g., Rupp et al., 2006; Aguilera et al., 2007)
and for a favorable social identity through the prestige that
other-directed CSR may bestow on the organization (e.g., Rupp,
2011; Rupp et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014). Third, beyond
the self-serving benefits (material and relational) that other-
directed CSR yields for them, (prospective) employees may value
other-directed CSR because treating third parties fairly is the
right thing to do from a moral standpoint (e.g., Rupp et al.,
2006, 2013; Aguilera et al., 2007). We build on and extend this
multimotive framework by investigating the moderating role of
individuals’ other-orientation and the mediating role of trust in
the relationship between tradeoffs and a firm’s attractiveness to
stakeholders.
Tradeoffs and Stakeholders’
Other-Orientation
A large body of evidence shows that individuals differ in the
degree to which they care about others’ welfare, which we
call “other-orientation,” and that these differences affect how
individuals behave when others are involved (Bridoux et al.,
2011). When making choices that impact their own and others’
welfare, individuals differ in the weight they assigned to (1)
the outcomes for one’s self, (2) the outcomes for others, and
(3) the fairness of the outcome distribution (e.g., Van Lange,
1999; De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; Stouten et al., 2005).
Differences along these dimensions lead to different “social value
orientations” (Messick andMcClintock, 1968; Nauta et al., 2002).
Different social value orientations exist, but the majority of
people can be classified as either “individualists” (20–40%) or
“prosocials” (40–60%; Bogaert et al., 2008). Individualists are self-
oriented in the sense that they are inclined to maximize personal
outcomes, whereas prosocials are other-oriented: they care for
others’ outcomes and fairness as well as for their own outcomes
(De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001).
Social value orientations help explain why individuals behave
differently when others are involved. In particular, individuals
high on other-orientation are more willing to cooperate than
individuals low on other-orientation (De Cremer and Van Lange,
2001). For example, employees high on other-orientation show
more organizational citizenship behavior (Rioux and Penner,
2001). While individuals high on other-orientation are generally
more inclined to cooperate, their behavior is also driven by
reciprocity: they aim to increase (decrease) the outcome for the
other party when they perceive this other party as behaving
(un)fairly (Liebrand et al., 1986; Van Lange, 1999; De Cremer
and Van Lange, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002a). In other
words, individuals high on other-orientation assign more weight
to other’s outcomes than individuals low on other-orientation
do, but this weight is not always positive. This depends on
the fairness of the other’s behavior, underlying intention, and
the procedure to allocate the outcome (Turillo et al., 2002).
In contrast, individuals low on other-orientation only adopt
contingent behaviors if they expect higher present or future
personal outcomes that offset the cost of behaving in contingent
ways (Trivers, 1971).
We expect other-orientation to be a source of heterogeneity
in stakeholders’ reactions to tradeoffs between self- and other-
directed CSR. Specifically, the relational and moral motives
driving positive reactions to other-directed CSR in Rupp and
colleagues’ framework (Rupp et al., 2006, 2011, 2013; Aguilera
et al., 2007; Rupp, 2011) fit the needs and preferences of
individuals high on other-orientation more than those of
individuals low on this personality trait. All stakeholders,
regardless of their degree of other-orientation, may value other-
directed CSR because it reduces uncertainty regarding their own
future material outcomes (Rupp et al., 2006, 2013; Aguilera et al.,
2007; Farooq et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014), but for stakeholders
high on other-orientation, other-directed CSR is also valuable
because they care about relating with others and fairness for its
own sake.
First, compared to individuals low on other-orientation,
individuals high on other-orientation value the opportunity to
give and receive “kindness” and resources more and they have
a preference for working with others if others reciprocate (Van
Lange, 1999; De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001). As a result, other-
directed CSR is more likely to positively affect self-esteem and
social identity for individuals high on other-orientation than for
those low on other-orientation (Rupp et al., 2013).
Second, individuals high on other-orientation value fairness
more than individuals low on other-orientation. Individuals high
on other-orientation assess behaviors on a “moral” dimension
(what is good or bad), while individuals low on other-orientation
tend to assess behaviors along an “effectiveness” dimension (what
works) (Liebrand et al., 1986; De Dreu and Boles, 1998). This
difference is reflected in their emotional reactions to situations
in which others behave unfairly. In Stouten et al.’s (2005)
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experiment, whereas individuals low on other-orientation were
no longer upset when informed that others’ unfair behavior
would not affect their own payoffs, individuals high on other-
orientation stayed upset because their anger came from to the
violation of the norm of fairness itself. As a result of valuing
fairness for its own sake, individuals high on other-orientation
are inclined to reward fairness and punish unfairness even
when it decreases their material outcomes, for example they
invest resources to punish strangers with whom they will not
interact again (Fehr and Gächter, 2002b) and to punish those
who behave unfairly toward a third party (Fehr and Gächter,
2002b; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004). In line with this, there is already some evidence that
stakeholders’ other-orientation may play a role in their decision
to associate with firms investing in other-directed CSR, including
prospective employees’ decision to join (Evans and Davis, 2011)
and customers’ purchase intention (Schuler and Cording, 2006;
Doran, 2009).
Based on the above arguments, we expect other-orientation
to influence how much individuals value the personal material
benefits involved in self-directed CSR compared to the relational
benefits and the benefits to others provided by other-directed
CSR. Specifically, we expect stakeholders low on other-
orientation to prefer a tradeoff in favor of their own stakeholder
group. By comparison, we expect stakeholders high on other-
orientation to have a less marked preference between a tradeoff
in the favor of their own stakeholder group or of another group
because they also value other-directed CSR for relational and
moral reasons. This leads us to propose the following moderating
effect:
Hypothesis 1: Stakeholders’ other-orientation moderates the
relationship between a firm’s tradeoff and stakeholders’
intention to associate with the firm: the higher the other-
orientation, the smaller the difference in intention to associate
between a tradeoff in favor of stakeholders’ own group and a
tradeoff in a favor of another group.
Tradeoffs, Trust, and Stakeholders’
Other-Orientation
Stakeholders’ trust in the firm is a prime candidate among
the mechanisms through which CSR could affect stakeholders’
behavior toward to the firm (Hansen et al., 2011; Farooq et al.,
2014). Trust is ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that
the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that
other party’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). Highly trusted firms
have been argued to command positive stakeholder attitudes
and behaviors such as increased employees’ commitment and
organizational identification, job pursuit intention, satisfaction,
repeat purchases, reduced turnover intention, etc. (Greening and
Turban, 2000; Vlachos et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2011; De Roeck
and Delobbe, 2012; Farooq et al., 2014). Some authors have
even gone as far as to argue that the creation of trust among
stakeholders is the ‘first result of a firm’s CSR activities’ (Pivato
et al., 2008, p. 3).
We expect trust to mediate the relationship between tradeoffs
and firm’s attractiveness to stakeholders because trust is a
manifestation of stakeholders’ expectations that the firm can
fulfill the material, relational, and moral needs linked to the three
motives identified by Rupp and colleagues. A highly trusted firm
is one for which the current stakeholder-related activities raise
the expectation that managers will care for the future material
well-being of stakeholders (Rupp, 2011; Farooq et al., 2014),
will care to maintain high-quality relationships with stakeholders
(Rupp et al., 2006), and will favor ethically justifiable behavior
(Vlachos et al., 2009). Stakeholders’ trust in the firm has indeed
be linked to their perceptions of the firm’s benevolence (i.e.,
concern, caring, loyalty) and integrity (i.e., values, principles,
fairness) in addition to its ability (i.e., competence, skills,
efficiency; e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002;
Colquitt and Rodell, 2011). Conversely, low trust in the firm
indicates that the firm’s stakeholder-related activities do not fulfill
stakeholders’ need for control over future material outcomes, for
good relationships with other stakeholders andmanagers, and for
morality.
Stakeholder-related activities directed at both stakeholders’
own and other groups form the basis of stakeholders’ overall
impressions of trust (Rupp et al., 2006; Gillespie and Dietz,
2009; Rupp, 2011). That the firm’s treatment of their own group
influences stakeholders’ level of trust in the firm has long been
established in the justice literature (see, e.g., Cohen-Charash
and Spector’s (2001) meta-analysis for employees). Recent work
suggests that, beyond this, the treatment of other stakeholders,
such as customers, also affects employees’ trust in the firm
(e.g., Weibel et al., 2015). And, empirical evidence exists for
a mediating effect of trust in the relationship between other-
directed CSR and stakeholders’ responses (Vlachos et al., 2009;
Hansen et al., 2011; De Roeck and Delobbe, 2012; Farooq et al.,
2014). The above arguments lead us to hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Trust mediates the relationship between a firm’s
tradeoffs and stakeholders’ intention to associate with the firm.
We further expect that the mediating influence of trust
is moderated by stakeholders’ other-orientation because the
relational and moral needs driving the more positive reactions
to other-directed CSR in stakeholders high on other-orientation
also make these stakeholders more vulnerable to managers
behaving unfairly toward themselves and other stakeholders.
Because they seek to fulfill relational needs in their relationships
with the firm and its managers (Bridoux and Stoelhorst,
accepted), individuals high on other-orientation are inclined to
cooperate beyond the call of duty, expecting their relational
partners to reciprocate, but this “natural inclination to cooperate
makes them vulnerable for being exploited by non-cooperative
alters” (Boone et al., 2010,p. 800). Aware of this danger,
individuals high on other-orientation are much less likely to
cooperate if they suspect the other party may be uncooperative
(Van Lange and Semin-Goossens, 1998; De Cremer and Van
Lange, 2001), which explains that trust in the firm’s benevolence
plays an important role in alleviating the fear of exploitation of
individuals high on other-orientation (Bogaert et al., 2008; Boone
et al., 2010). Furthermore, individuals high on other-orientation
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seek to fulfill a moral need for fairness in their relationships with
the firm and its managers (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, accepted). As
a consequence, they risk strong negative moral emotions such
as anger if managers behave unfairly, not only toward them
(Stouten et al., 2005) but also toward third parties (Nelissen and
Zeelenberg, 2009). This risk is lower when associating with a firm
that is perceived to be high on integrity, which offers a second
explanation for the importance of trust for stakeholders high on
other-orientation.
In contrast, in their relationships with the firm and its
managers, individuals low on other-orientation are focused
primarily on satisfying their needs for material well-being
and they expect the same from intelligent others (Bridoux
and Stoelhorst, accepted; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994). For
example, in situations where cooperation could take place,
individuals low on other orientation expect others to be non-
cooperative and opt for non-cooperation themselves unless
cooperating serves their own interest best (e.g., Van Dijk et al.,
2004). Because individuals low on other-orientation tend to
prioritize their need for material well-being and invest less in
their relationships with the firm and its managers, they face
a lower risk of being exploited and, as a result, trust is less
important for these individuals than it is for individuals high
on other-orientation (Joireman et al., 1997; Boone et al., 2010).
Thus, we expect stakeholders’ reactions to tradeoffs to be more
sensitive to trust for individuals high on other-orientation than
for the ones low on this personality trait:
Hypothesis 3: Stakeholders’ other-orientation strengthens the
mediation effect of trust on the relationship between a firm’s
tradeoffs and stakeholders’ intention to associate with the firm.
Methods
Experimental Design and Procedure
Stakeholders’ responses to tradeoffs between self- and other-
directed CSR were studied using a between-subject experimental
design based on vignettes among 908 participants. Participants
were presented with “similar but not identical” scenarios where
self- and other-directed CSR was manipulated (Wallander,
2009, p. 505). Vignette studies have frequently been used in
academic research relating to CSR (e.g., Sen and Bhattacharya,
2001; Sen et al., 2006; White et al., 2012; Rupp et al., 2013).
Vignettes have also been used to study consumers’ responses to
tradeoffs in product attributes (e.g., Barone et al., 2000; Berens
et al., 2007) and the moderating influence of personal values
(Adams et al., 2011). To avoid framing effects, participants
were randomly assigned to one of the vignettes (Berens et al.,
2007).
To ensure that our results were robust across stakeholder
groups, we developed vignettes in which participants were put
in the shoes of customers or prospective employees. In line with
Hillenbrand et al. (2013), we chose customers and employees
as they are the most immediate stakeholders of any firm and
have the greatest impact on firms’ stakeholder management
(Aguilera et al., 2007). This also had the advantage that we could
select our participants from the same participant pool for both
stakeholder groups, which helps increase comparability across
the two stakeholder groups. Like in similar studies (e.g., Sen et al.,
2006), our participants were graduate students (N = 908).
We wanted to check that our results were not idiosyncratic
to the stakeholder group presented as the other group in the
vignettes. Thus, we presented the participants who were asked
to imagine themselves as prospective employees with either
suppliers in developing countries or the environment as the other
stakeholder group. In contrast, we only investigated customers’
reactions in relation to suppliers in developing countries to limit
the number of participants needed. We chose the suppliers in
developing countries and the environment as other stakeholder
groups for two reasons. First, our pretest showed that participants
were on average sensitive to these stakeholders. Second, the firm’s
investments in these two stakeholder groups only very indirectly
benefit customers and prospective employees, so there is indeed
a tradeoff between these stakeholder groups’ material interests
that managers must manage rather than a win-win situation
where both stakeholder groups’ interests are easily reconciled.
We thus collected responses for three sets (customers—suppliers
in developing countries; employees—suppliers in developing
countries; employees—environment) of three vignettes (self-
directed CSR > other-directed CSR; self-directed CSR < other-
directed CSR; high self- and other-directed CSR). We collected
responses for the case of high CSR toward both stakeholder
groups in order to be able to use stakeholders’ reactions in the
absence of tradeoff as benchmark.
Our vignettes (see Appendix in Data Sheet 1) portrayed a
hypothetical company ABC that sells electronic goods and is
doing well financially. This context was chosen because our
participant pool, graduate students, are “significant patrons of
consumer electronics retailers” making this context “particularly
relevant” for them (Wagner et al., 2009, p. 80). The vignettes
presented company ABC as scoring “much higher” or “slightly
lower” thanmajor competitors in its treatment of the participant’s
stakeholder group and as scoring “much higher” or “slightly
lower” in its treatment of another stakeholder group. To enhance
credibility, the information on company ABC’s stakeholder
management was described as provided by an independent and
highly respected rating agency (Mohr and Webb, 2005).
CSR aimed at employees, consumers, and suppliers was
described in terms of how company ABC scores in terms of
distributive and procedural justice because good relationships
with stakeholders are based on principles of distributive and
procedural justice (Hosmer and Kiewitz, 2005; Rupp et al.,
2006). Research shows that both consumers and employees
identify fair processes and procedures as important in their
dealings with companies (Folger and Bies, 1989; Kumar, 1997;
Hillenbrand et al., 2013). With regard to distributive justice,
the vignettes described wages for employees (Schminke et al.,
1997), prices of products for consumers (Peloza and Shang,
2011), and prices paid to suppliers (Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010).
Procedural justice toward employees was operationalized based
on the keymanagerial responsibilities toward employees outlined
by Folger and Bies (1989). Procedural justice toward consumers
closely mirrored the employee vignette to enhance comparability
between these two stakeholder groups. Procedural justice toward
supplier was operationalized using Kumar (1997) and Duffy et al.
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(2003). Following Mohr and Webb (2005), the firm’s treatment
of the environment was operationalized using dimensions such
as pollution of factories, recycling of materials, and programs to
conserve water and energy.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations and with the approval of the Ethics
Committee Economics and Business (University of Amsterdam).
The vignettes were pretested to ensure that they were perceived
as realistic. This pretest indicated that vignettes reporting
much lower levels of CSR, especially self-directed CSR, were
perceived as unrealistic. As a result, and in line with Berens
et al. (2007), we chose to avoid extremely negative levels of the
manipulation for low self- and other-directed CSR in order to
ensure that the vignette came across as sufficiently realistic. The
online questionnaire took approximately 20min to complete.
Participants were graduate students from 13 Dutch universities
who were solicited to participate in the study by a student either
on campus (e.g., in the university canteen) or via e-mail. In the
days following this first contact, the students who accepted to
participate received an e-mail containing the link to the online
questionnaire.
Measures
Dependent Variables
For customers the dependent variable is purchase intention. The
four-item scale is adopted from White et al. (2012) and includes
the items: “I would be likely to purchase a product from ABC,”
“I would be willing to buy a product from ABC,” “I would
likely make ABC one of my first choices in consumer goods
electronics,” and “I would exert a great deal of effort to purchase
a product from ABC.” For prospective employees the dependent
variable is job pursuit intention, measured with a four-item scale
coming from Greening and Turban (2000): “I would put in a
great deal of effort to work for ABC,” “I would be interested in
pursuing a job application with ABC,” “I am likely to send my
resume (CV) to ABC,” and “I am likely to accept a job offer
from ABC.” For both variables, the answer scale was seven-point
ranging from not true for me to very true for me.
Trust
We used the scale from Sirdeshmukh et al. (2002) and measured
participants’ trust in Company ABC on a semantic differential
seven-point scale ranging from “very incompetent/very
competent,” “very undependable/very dependable,” “of very
low integrity/of very high integrity,” and “very dishonest and
untrustworthy/very honest and trustworthy.”
Individual Characteristics
As suggested by Schuler and Cording (2006), we used Schwartz’s
(1994) self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement dimension to
capture other-orientation. Schwartz’s personal values have
already been used to explain stakeholders’ reactions to firms’ CSR
activities (e.g., Golob et al., 2008). Self-enhancement represents
a self-oriented view of social situations and involves “the
pursuit of one’s relative success and dominance over others”
(Schwartz, 1994, p. 25). It includes the values power (defined
as valuing social status and prestige, control, or dominance
over people and resources) and achievement (valuing personal
success through demonstrating competence according to social
standards). In contrast, self-transcendence relates to an other-
oriented view of social situations as it expresses “acceptance of
others as equals and concern for their welfare” (Schwartz, 1994, p.
25). Self-transcendence comprises universalism (understanding,
appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all
people and for nature), and benevolence (preservation and
enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in
frequent personal contact).
Self-transcendence and self-enhancement were measured
using the portrait value questionnaire developed by Schwartz
et al. (2001). Each portrait describes a person’s goals or
aspirations that point implicitly to the importance of a value.
For example, “It is important to him to respond to the needs
of others. He tries to support those he knows.” describes a
person to whom benevolence is important. For each portrait,
participants answer “How much like you is this person?” on a
6-point scale ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like
me.” The number of portraits ranges from three (power) to four
(benevolence, achievement) to six (universalism), reflecting the
conceptual breadth of the values1.
Control Variables
The demographics gender, age, nationality, and field of study
were included as controls. In addition, for the vignettes related
to prospective employees, we measured participants’ interest in
working for a consumer goods company and asked whether
they had already found a job for after graduation to control
for the influence of these factors on participants’ intention to
apply for a job at Company ABC. Finally, we controlled for
participants’ support for the other stakeholder group because
previous research has found a moderating effect of customer
support for a specific group on the relationships between CSR
toward this group and customers’ evaluation and purchase
intention: customers with high level of support for a particular
stakeholder group react more strongly to a firm’s CSR directed
at this group (e.g., Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Mohr and Webb,
2005). We measured participants’ support for the environment
with three items adopted fromMohr andWebb (2005). A sample
item is “Companies should make every effort to reduce the
pollution from their factories.” For support for suppliers we
adopted three items from De Pelsmacker and Janssens (2007),
including “Treating suppliers in developing countries fairly is
important.”
Manipulation Checks
Participants were asked to assess the company’s treatment of the
stakeholder groups described in the vignette they received. For
1Following Schwartz’s (1992) recommendation, we mean-centered participants’
scores to control for individuals’ differences in the use of the response scale. Below
we report results using mean-centered self-transcendence scores to capture other-
orientation. We also ran all the analyses with mean-centered self-enhancement
scores and scores combining self-transcendence and self-enhancement without
mean-centering. The findings are almost identical. In the very few cases where
the results are not identical, they are slightly more significant than the results we
report for self-transcendence, thus fully supporting the conclusions we draw based
on self-transcendence.
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example, those put in the role of prospective employees were
asked to rate the statement “ABC treats its employees well” on a
seven-point scale (not at all—very much). All participants were
also asked to rate “I had no difficulty imagining myself in the
situation” on a seven-point Likert scale (not at all-very much) to
determine vignette credibility.
RESULTS
We collected 908 completed questionnaires. Among our
participants, 54% were female, 76% were Dutch (90% European),
39% studied Business, and Economics (the rest was spread over
many fields of study), and 16% had already found a job for after
graduation. The average age was 24.44 with little variation (SD=
2.45). The 908 participants were divided relatively equally across
the nine vignettes (see Table 1 for exact numbers).
Internal Validity of Multi-Item Scales and
Manipulation Checks
We assessed the measures using confirmatory factor analysis.
After allowing the error terms to covary among some item-pairs
for self-transcendence, the fit of a four-factor model (including
self-transcendence, trust, support for the other stakeholder
group, and the dependent variable, namely purchase intention
or job pursuit intention) is satisfactory. For the customers
vignettes, the χ2 is 358.28 for 177◦ of freedom, the comparative
fit index (CFI) reaches 0.90, and the root-mean-square error of
approximation (RMSEA) is 0.06. For the employees vignettes,
the χ2 is 469.53 for 178◦ of freedom, CFI is 0.94, and RMSEA is
0.05. Sequential χ2 difference tests show that these models fit the
data better than alternative models with fewer or more factors.
Cronbach’s alphas are reported in Table 1.
Our manipulations were successful. Analyses of variance
(ANOVA) conducted to determine the effects of the manipulated
self- and other-directed CSR on perceived stakeholder treatment
show that the manipulated CSR significantly affected perceived
treatment in the expected direction for both the own and
the other group. For example, an ANOVA indicates that the
manipulated other-directed CSR significantly related to our
manipulation checks “ABC treats its suppliers well” and “ABC
treats the environment well” (F = 268.88, p < 0.001): multiple
comparisons show significant differences between the vignettes
in which the manipulation was different for the other group
and no significant difference between the vignette in which the
manipulation was the same. With regard to vignette credibility,
the mean across the entire sample was 4.65 on a seven-point scale
and ratings were not significantly different across vignettes.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. In
line with previous studies (e.g., Meier and Frey, 2004),
men in our sample score lower on other-orientation than
women and Business and Economics students score lower
on other-orientation than students from other fields. Our
Dutch participants score lower on other-orientation than other
nationalities, which might be due to the fact that they are
also younger (Van Lange et al., 1997). Participants’ support for
both suppliers and the environment relates positively to other-
orientation, which is in line with the literature on CSR that has
taken personal values into account (e.g., Doran, 2009).
The correlations indicate that intention to associate is higher
in the absence than in the presence of tradeoffs among
stakeholder groups’ welfare. Analyses of covariance including
the control variables also support that stakeholders’ intention
to associate with the firm is significantly lower when self-
or other-directed CSR is low than when both are high (e.g.,
for the customers—suppliers set of vignettes, MSelf-directed
CSR > Other-directed CSR = 3.83, MSelf-directed CSR < Other-directed CSR
= 3.92, MHigh self- and other-directed CSR = 5.24, F = 61.74,
p < 0.001). These results support the interest of studying
stakeholders’ reactions to tradeoffs. Finally, the correlations show
that trust is significantly and positively related to purchase and
job pursuit intention.
Hypothesis Tests
To investigate Hypothesis 1, which predicts that stakeholders’
other-orientation moderates the relationships between a
tradeoff and purchase and job pursuit intention, we conducted
hierarchical regression analyses. For each of the three sets of
vignettes, we compared the vignette with low self-directed
CSR and high other-directed CSR (Self < Other) with the
vignette with high self-directed CSR and low other-directed
CSR (Self > Other). In our regressions, we entered the control
variables and the dummy for the vignette Self < Other in the first
step (Models 1a, 2a and 3a, Table 2), the moderating variable,
other-orientation, in the second step (Models 1b, 2b, and 3b,
Table 2), and the interaction effect of this moderating variable
with the vignette dummy in the last step (Models 1c, 2c, and 3c,
Table 2). The results support Hypothesis 1. The main effects of
the vignettes and other-orientation are not significant in Models
1 and 2; however, the interaction term is significant and positive.
We graphed the interactive effects to better understand their
nature. Figure 1 shows that, in the case of suppliers as the other
stakeholder group, purchase intention and job pursuit intention
are not, on average, significantly different for the vignette Self <
Other compared to the vignette Self > Other because individuals
high and low on other-orientation have opposite reactions to
the vignettes. Stakeholders high on other-orientation (i.e., one
standard deviation above 0) are more willing to associate with
the firm when the tradeoff is in favor of suppliers in developing
countries, while stakeholders low on other-orientation (i.e., one
standard deviation below 0) are more attracted to the firm when
the tradeoff is in their favor.
In contrast, for the vignettes related to the environment,
the coefficient for the vignette Self < Other is significant and
negative. Thus, on average, participants have a higher intention to
pursue a job with a firm that makes a tradeoff between employee-
and environment-directed CSR that is in favor of employees.
Other-orientation moderates this relationship in the sense that
the decrease in job pursuit intention between the vignette Self >
Other and the vignette Self < Other is smaller for participants
higher on other-orientation. Figure 2 depicts this interaction.
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TABLE 2 | Results of regression analyses testing the moderation effect of other-orientation on the relationship between tradeoffs and purchase and job
pursuit intention.
Predictors Customers-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Environment vignettes
Model 1aa Model 1ba Model 1ca Model 2ab Model 2bb Model 2cb Model 3ab Model 3bb Model 3cb
Vignette Self < Other 0.10 0.10 0.05 −0.08 −0.09 −0.07 −0.65*** −0.63*** −0.61***
Other-orientation 0.02 −0.22 −0.05 −0.24 0.21 −0.03
Vignette X Other-orientation 0.57*** 0.48* 0.52**
CONTROLS:
Support other stakeholder group −0.18* −0.18* −0.22* 0.04 0.06 0.06 −0.27* −0.30** −0.30**
Male 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.45* 0.45* 0.54** −0.25 −0.24 −0.20
Age −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.00 −0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.01
Dutch 0.03 0.03 −0.01 0.05 0.04 −0.06 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
Business and Economics 0.21 0.22 0.29 −0.15 −0.17 −0.19 0.02 0.12 0.12
Found Job 0.03 0.02 0.12 −0.53* −0.45 −0.48
Interest Consumer Goods Company 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.36***
N 194 194 194 194 194 194 207 207 207
Total R2 0.56 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33
Overall F 1.85 1.58 3.00** 8.3*** 7.37*** 7.26*** 10.44*** 9.84*** 9.84***
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.30
Change in R2 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
aThe dependent variable is Purchase intention
bThe dependent variable is Job Pursuit intention
The unstandardized coefficients are reported.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001, two-tailed test
The label “vignette Self < Other” refers to the scenario in which self-directed CSR was low and other-directed CSR was high. The baseline is the vignette in which self-directed CSR
was high and other-directed CSR was low.
FIGURE 1 | Moderation effects of other-orientation on the relationship between tradeoffs and stakeholders’ intention to associate with the firm for the
consumers–suppliers (left) and employees-suppliers vignettes (right). The label “Self > Other” refers to the scenario in which self-directed CSR was high and
other-directed CSR was low. The label “Self < Other” refers the vignette in which self-directed CSR was low and other-directed CSR was high.
Hypothesis 2 proposes that trust mediates the relationship
between tradeoffs and intention to associate with the firm. We
used Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS application to test this hypothesis.
As hypothesized, tradeoffs have an indirect effect through trust
(see Tables 3, 4), which is positive for the customers-suppliers
(0.38) and employees-suppliers vignettes (0.48), but negative for
the employees-environment ones (−0.168). The Sobel test and
bootstrap confidence intervals show that these indirect effects are
significant, as evidenced, in the case of the customers-suppliers
vignettes, by a Sobel z = 0.09 (p = 0.00) and a 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval that does not include
zero (0.23–0.57). Interestingly, the total relationship between
the vignette Self < Other and intention to associate was not
significant for the customers-suppliers (0.10, p = 0.52, Model
4b) and employees-suppliers vignettes (−0.08, p = 0.63, Model
5b) because the indirect effect (0.38 and 0.46, respectively) and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1992
Bridoux et al. Stakeholders’ Responses to CSR Tradeoffs
FIGURE 2 | Moderation effects of other-orientation on the relationship
between tradeoffs and stakeholders’ intention to associate with the
firm for the employees-environment vignettes. The label “Self > Other”
refers to the scenario in which self-directed CSR was high and other-directed
CSR was low. The label “Self < Other” refers the vignette in which self-directed
CSR was low and other-directed CSR was high.
the direct effect controlling for trust (−0.28, p = 0.05, Model
4c, and −0.56, p = 0.00, Model 5c) have an opposite sign.
This suggests the presence of mediational suppression, i.e., the
negative direct effect of a tradeoff in favor of the other stakeholder
group is canceled out by the positive indirect effect through trust,
resulting in an insignificant total effect (MacKinnon et al., 2000;
Shrout and Bolger, 2002).
Hypothesis 3 proposes that other-orientation strengthens the
mediating effect of trust in the relationship between tradeoffs
and stakeholders’ intention to associate with the firm. We used
Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS application to assess the significance of
conditional indirect effects at different values of the moderator
variable (i.e., moderated mediation, Preacher et al., 2007). Results
for Hypothesis 3 are reported in Tables 5, 6.
Table 6 shows the conditional indirect effect of a preferential
treatment through trust at three levels of other orientation:
the mean, one standard deviation above, and one standard
deviation below the mean. For the customers-suppliers vignettes,
the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals indicate
that the three conditional effects are positive and significant. The
conditional effect is significantly larger when other-orientation
is high than when it is low to moderate. For the employees-
suppliers, two of the three conditional indirect effects are
significant. The indirect and positive effect of a tradeoff in favor
of suppliers through trust is observed when other-orientation is
moderate to high, but not when it is low. Thus, Hypothesis 3
is supported for customers-suppliers and employees-suppliers.
For the employees-environment vignettes, Hypothesis 3 is not
supported. We observe a stronger indirect and negative effect
of a tradeoff in favor of the environment through trust when
other-orientation is low tomoderate thanwhen other-orientation
is high (where it is not statistically different from zero).
The results reported in Table 5 show which stage of the
mediation path is moderated by other-orientation. Models 7a, 8a,
and 9a in Table 5 show that the interaction term of the vignette
Self < Other and other-orientation is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level in the employees-suppliers vignettes
(b = 0.37, p = 0.03), but not significant for customers-suppliers
(b = 0.21, p = 0.14) and employees-environment vignettes
(b = 0.24, p = 0.07). Models 7b, 8b, and 9b show that the
interaction of trust and other-orientation is significant in the
customers-suppliers vignettes (b = 0.16, p = 0.05), but not
for the others. This indicates a moderation of the first stage in
the employees-suppliers and of the second stage in the other
vignettes.
DISCUSSION
Contributions and Implications
Our study extends the limited knowledge about stakeholders’
reactions to tradeoffs between self- and other-directed CSR (e.g.,
Handelman and Arnold, 1999; Auger et al., 2003, 2008, 2013;
Vlachos et al., 2009, 2014; Rupp et al., 2013). At the most
fundamental level, our finding that stakeholders’ intention to
associate with the firm is significantly lower in the presence
than in the absence of a CSR tradeoff supports the claim that
studying CSR tradeoffs is relevant. We extends the burgeoning
literature on CSR tradeoffs by studying (1) the moderating effect
of other-orientation, (2) the mediating role of trust, (3) the
reactions of both prospective employees and customers, and (4)
by considering CSR targeted at suppliers in developing countries
and at the environment separately rather than using a measure
of CSR that aggregates the firm’s CSR toward several other
stakeholder group. By doing this, our work contributes in several
ways to the literature on CSR at the individual level, which
is still in its infancy (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012), and to the
organizational psychology literature.
A first contribution is to show that stakeholders’ other-
orientation helps explain stakeholders’ reactions to CSR tradeoffs.
The literature on social value orientations in social psychology
and behavioral economics has long argued that some people
are primarily focused on their material self-interest, whereas
others also care for other people’s welfare and for fairness as
a moral norm (e.g., Van Lange, 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2002a). In the present paper we relate this body of literature to
the three motives that, according to Rupp and colleagues, drive
stakeholders’ reactions to other-directed CSR. For the micro-
CSR literature, our finding of a moderating effect of other-
orientation adds another boundary condition in the Rupp and
colleagues’ multimotive framework in addition to the qualifying
effect of individual differences in moral identity tested by Rupp
et al. (2013). In particular, both Rupp et al. (2013) and Vlachos
et al. (2009) found that other-directed CSR matters less when
self-directed CSR is high. For example, Vlachos et al. (2009)
found that in case of high self-directed CSR in the form of
high perceived service quality consumer trust was less negatively
affected by consumers’ attributing the firm’s other-directed CSR
to selfish motives rather than altruistic motives. Our findings
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TABLE 3 | Regression results for testing the mediation effect of trust on the relationship between tradeoffs and purchase and job pursuit intention.
Predictors Customers-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Environment vignettes
Trust Purchase intention Trust Job pursuit intention Trust Job pursuit intention
Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c
Vignette Self < Other 0.64*** 0.10 −0.28* 0.69*** −0.08 −0.56*** −0.30** −0.65*** −0.48**
Trust 0.59*** 0.69*** 0.55***
CONTROLS:
Support otherstakeholder group −0.08 −0.18* −0.13 −0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 −0.27** −0.32**
Male 0.30* 0.19 0.01 0.49** 0.45* 0.12 0.02 −0.25 −0.26
Age −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.03 0.01 0.03
Dutch −0.16 0.03 0.13 −0.16 0.05 0.16 −0.23 −0.01 0.12
Business and Economics 0.08 0.21 0.17 −0.21 −0.15 −0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Found Job 0.27 0.03 −0.16 −0.06 −0.53* −0.50*
Interest Consumer Goods Company 0.08* 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.35*** 0.32***
N 194 194 194 194 194 194 207 207 207
Overall F 6.00*** 1.85 10.51*** 5.86*** 8.31*** 18.55*** 2.25* 10.44*** 13.99***
R2 0.16 0.06 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.48 0.08 0.3 0.390
The unstandardized coefficients are reported.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001, two-tailed test
The label “vignette Self < Other” refers to the scenario in which self-directed CSR was low and other-directed CSR was high. The baseline is the vignette in which self-directed CSR
was high and other-directed CSR was low.
TABLE 4 | Indirect effect and significance using normal distributiona.
Value SE LL95%CI UL95%CI Sobel z p
Customers-Suppliers vignettes 0.38 0.09 0.23 0.57 4.25 0.00
Employees-Suppliers vignettes 0.48 0.11 0.28 0.68 4.30 0.00
Employees-Environment vignettes −0.17 0.07 −0.35 −0.05 −2.32 0.02
aBootstrap sample size = 5000; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit; CI = confidence interval.
suggest that this egocentric bias may be especially important to
explain the reactions of stakeholders lower on other-orientation.
Similarly, our findings suggest the need to qualify Rupp et al.’s
(2013) conclusion that high other-directed CSR can compensate
for lower self-directed CSR: this conclusion is likely to hold for
stakeholders higher on other-orientation, but may not hold for
stakeholders lower on this trait.
Beyond the CSR field, for organizational psychologists
interested in organizational justice, our work adds to the body
of evidence supporting the use of the relational model (Tyler
and Lind, 1992) and deontic model of organizational justice
(Folger, 2001; Folger et al., 2005) in addition to the instrumental
model (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Furthermore, like Rupp and
colleagues had previously shown for moral identity (Skarlicki
and Rupp, 2010; Rupp et al., 2013), our results reveal the need
for a nuanced story: the relational and deontic models may be
more relevant to understand the reactions of people higher on
other-orientation than those of people lower on this personality
trait. For future research this suggests including personality
traits linked to all three motives, for example risk aversion in
relation to the uncertainty reduction motive (Colquitt et al.,
2006), other-orientation and the need to belong (Leary et al.,
2013) in relation to the relational motive, and moral identity in
relation to the morality motive (Rupp et al., 2013).
For macro theories such as stakeholder theory, our results
indicate a need to rethink the concept of tradeoffs by
adoptingmore realistic microfoundations (cf., Bosse and Phillips,
Forthcoming; Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014, accepted). In
relation to tradeoffs, stakeholder theory has narrowly focused
on stakeholders’ material well-being, which leads to see tradeoffs
among stakeholder groups in all situations in which increasing
the material well-being of one stakeholder group comes at some
material costs for another group. Even stakeholder theorists
arguing that managers should not frame decisions as trading off
stakeholders’ interests but should look for ways to achieve win-
win synergies have primarily emphasized stakeholders’ material
well-being in their illustrations of such win-win synergies
(e.g., Freeman et al., 2010). For example, to defend treating
employees well, they argue that increasing wages might improve
employees’ well-being and, at the same time, serve shareholders’
interests because employees’ productivity and, thus, profits for
shareholders increase. Yet, our results show, in line with Rupp
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TABLE 5 | Regression results for testing moderated mediation.
Predictors Customers-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Environment vignettes
Trust Purchase intention Trust Job pursuit intention Trust Job pursuit intention
Model 7a Model 7b Model 8a Model 8b Model 9a Model 9b
Vignette Self < Other 0.62*** −0.33* 0.70*** −0.52** −0.29* −0.48**
Other-orientation 0.04 −0.31** −0.26* −0.09 −0.02 −0.03
Vignette X Other-orientation 0.21 0.56*** 0.37* 0.27 0.24 0.43*
Trust 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.52***
Trust X Other-orientation 0.16* −0.09 0.11
CONTROLS:
Support otherstakeholder group −0.13 −0.15 −0.00 0.07 0.08 −0.34***
Male 0.29* 0.07 0.59*** 0.18 0.04 −0.24
Age −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.00 −0.04 0.01
Dutch −0.15 0.10 −0.26 0.11 −0.23 0.10
Business and Economics 0.13 0.20 −0.27 −0.03 0.06 0.10
Found Job 0.34 −0.09 −0.04 −0.46
Interest ConsumerGoods Company 0.08* 0.30*** 0.03 0.33***
N 194 194 194 194 207 207
Overall F 5.24*** 10.57*** 5.44*** 14.10*** 2.34* 11.49***
R2 0.19 0.37 0.23 0.48 0.11 0.42
The unstandardized coefficients are reported.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001, two-tailed test
The label “vignette Self < Other” refers to the scenario in which self-directed CSR was low and other-directed CSR was high. The baseline is the vignette in which self-directed CSR
was high and other-directed CSR was low.
TABLE 6 | Indirect effect of trust at different levels of other-orientationa.
Customers-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Suppliers vignettes Employees-Environment vignettes
Effect SE LL95%CI UL95%CI Effect SE LL95%CI UL95%CI Effect SE LL95%CI UL95%CI
−1SD 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.40 0.27 0.18 −0.07 0.63 −0.21 0.100 −0.46 −0.06
Mean 0.37 0.08 0.22 0.55 0.46 0.10 0.27 0.68 −0.15 0.07 −0.32 −0.04
+1SD 0.59 0.14 0.36 0.91 0.59 0.17 0.30 0.99 −0.05 0.10 −0.29 0.14
aThe indirect effect of trust is reported for the mean of other-orientation (Mean) and for one standard deviation below (–1SD) and one standard deviation above (+1SD) the mean;
Bootstrap sample size, 5000; LL, lower limit; UL, upper limit; CI, confidence interval.
and colleagues’ framework, that personal material well-being is
not all that matters for stakeholders higher on other-orientation.
So, it might in fact be easier to reconcile the economic and
moral component in stakeholder-related activities than the
literature usually assumes, because stakeholders higher on other-
orientation value relationships andmorality (beyond thematerial
benefits that these relationships or morality could bring them).
In our example, shareholders higher on other-orientation may
accept lower returns from firms investing in other stakeholder
groups’ well-being. This calls for a concept of tradeoff that is not
based exclusively on stakeholders’ material well-being but that is
based on more realistic views regarding what stakeholders really
value (cf. Harrison and Wicks, 2013).
A second contribution of our study is to answer recent calls in
the organizational literature to research mechanisms linking CSR
activities to individual-level outcomes (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012;
Jones et al., 2014). In line with recent work in the CSR literature
(Vlachos et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2011; Farooq et al., 2014), we
found that trust mediates the relationship between tradeoffs and
stakeholders’ intention to associate with the firm, Yet, the effect is
more complex than scholars previously suggested.With suppliers
as the other group, while the direct effect of a tradeoff in suppliers’
favor is negative, the indirect effect, through trust, is positive,
indicating a “suppressed mediation” (MacKinnon et al., 2000;
Shrout and Bolger, 2002). Thus, in some tradeoff situations, much
higher other-directed CSR seems to compensate for slightly lower
self-directed CSR, because, we argue, stakeholders perceive other-
directed CSR as the manifestation that the firm will care for the
futurematerial well-being of all stakeholders (Rupp, 2011; Farooq
et al., 2014), will care to maintain high-quality relationships with
stakeholders (Rupp et al., 2006), and will favor ethically justifiable
behavior (Vlachos et al., 2009). This explains why stakeholders’
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1992
Bridoux et al. Stakeholders’ Responses to CSR Tradeoffs
intention to associate with a firm does not significantly differ
between a tradeoff in favor of stakeholders’ own group or in
favor of suppliers: the direct and indirect effects cancel each
other out (MacKinnon et al., 2000, p. 175). To our knowledge,
studies have not yet recognized that trust can have a suppression
effect. More generally, failure to include such key intervening
variables in previous researchmay help explain why scholars have
been “unable to reach an empirically grounded resolution” in
the CSR-firm performance relationship’ (Vlachos et al., 2009, p.
177). With only trust as mediator, our study cannot help identify
which mechanism(s) trust actually suppresses. In line with recent
micro-CSR research (Farooq et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014), we
recommend that future work includes additional mediators of the
relationship between CSR tradeoffs and stakeholders’ reactions.
The negative direct effect that remains after introducing trust
suggests that such a mechanism could be simply the perceived
immediate cost to self of high other-directed CSR.
In addition, with suppliers as the other group, trust mediated
the relationship between tradeoffs and stakeholders’ intention
to associate with the firm for individuals who scored higher
on other-orientation, but less (or not at all) for individuals
who scored lower on other-orientation. We expected such a
moderation because valuing relationships and fairness makes
individuals higher on other-orientation more vulnerable to
managers’ unfair behavior, both toward themselves and toward
other stakeholder groups. The organizational behavior and
psychology literature has often emphasized the role of trust,
providing strong evidence over the last three decades that trust
tends to matter in explaining employees’ attitudes and behaviors
(e.g., Colquitt et al., 2007). Yet, less attention has been paid
to individual differences in how sensitive employees’ attitudes
and behaviors are to trust. Our results suggest that it would
be interesting to research the link between propensity to trust
(Mayer and Davis, 1999) and other-orientation, as well as
investigating whether other-orientation indeed implies a higher
sensitivity to the benevolence and integrity aspects of trust in
particular, as suggested by our arguments building on Rupp and
colleagues’ framework.
In interpreting our results for the mediating role of trust and
the moderated mediation, it is important to keep in mind that we
tested scenarios in which the unfavorable side of the tradeoff is
presented as slightly lower CSR than at competing firms whereas
the favorable side is formulated as much higher. This is in line
with some previous work (e.g., Berens et al., 2007) and based on
our pretest of the vignettes seemed necessary to ensure realism,
but this also means that in all tradeoff situations we described
a firm with a combined CSR (self- plus other-directed CSR)
above the industry average. Consumers and employees associate
voluntarily with the firm, which implies that their decision to
associate with the firm is necessarily relative to the other options
available to them. As such, it is certainly easier to trust a firm
favoring another stakeholder group if self-directed CSR is only
slightly lower than what the available options would offer and
if the combined CSR is above average compared to these other
options. Stakeholders’ acceptance of a tradeoff in favor of another
group is very likely limited, even for individuals high on other-
orientation, as they care for their material well-being besides
fairness and others’ well-being (Van Lange, 1999; Auger et al.,
2013).
A third contribution of our work is to offer the opportunity to
compare prospective employees’ and customers’ reactions to CSR
tradeoffs in the same study. Previous research focused on either
(prospective) employees or customers (e.g., Handelman and
Arnold, 1999; Auger et al., 2003, 2008, 2013; Vlachos et al., 2009,
2014; Rupp et al., 2013). Our patterns of results are very similar
across the two groups, yet not completely identical. Interestingly,
the direct effect of a CSR tradeoff in favor of suppliers in
developing countries after controlling for the mediating role of
trust is smaller for customers than for prospective employees (see
the coefficients for the vignette Self < Other in Models 4c and 5c,
as well as Models 7b and 8b). Assuming, as conjectured above,
that this negative direct effect is due at least partly to the perceived
immediate cost to self of high other-directed CSR, this difference
in the strength of this negative direct effect between prospective
employees and customers makes sense: prospective employees’
total personal welfare is much more dependent on the firm’s CSR
toward employees than customers’ total personal welfare is on the
firm’s CSR toward customers.
A fourth contribution of our work is to reveal differences
in stakeholders’ reactions according to which other stakeholder
group is involved in the tradeoff. We did not anticipate such
differences. As stated in the method section, we included
scenarios related to the environment to check the generalizability
of our findings to other stakeholder groups besides suppliers
in developing countries. Yet, in contrast to a tradeoff in
favor of suppliers in developing countries, for the employees-
environment vignettes, we found a moderating effect but no
opposite reactions based on other-orientation. Furthermore, a
tradeoff in favor of the environment had a negative direct
effect on participants’ intention to associate with the firm as
well as a negative indirect effect through trust, suggesting two
mechanisms working in the same direction. Finally, the negative
indirect effect was stronger for participants lower on other-
orientation rather than for the ones higher on this personality
trait. These findings are in line with recent studies showing that
the identity of the other group matters to explain stakeholders’
reactions to CSR (Jones et al., 2014). This difference between
suppliers in developing countries and the environment as other
stakeholder group cannot be explained by higher support for
CSR directed at suppliers than for CSR toward the environment.
Our participants reported high support for both types of CSR
activities and even slightly higher support for the environment
than for suppliers in developing countries (see averages in
Table 1). In addition, we included participants’ support for the
other stakeholder group as a control variable.
Rupp and colleagues’ framework suggests three potential
reasons for differences in findings between a tradeoff involving
the environment and one involving other human beings.
Compared to CSR directed at other human beings, stakeholders
may perceive CSR directed at the environment as revealing less
about how fairly the firm will treat themselves in the future,
thus not fulfilling their need for control over future outcomes
to the same extent as CSR directed at suppliers in developing
countries (Willness and Jones, 2013). Second, CSR directed at
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the environment is less relationally oriented and may not fulfill
stakeholders’ need to relate to others as well as CSR directed at
other human beings does (Aguilera et al., 2007; Glavas and Kelley,
2014). Finally, the environment itself is not capable of having
sensations such as pain and pleasure, which many philosophers
consider as an important determinant of moral status inWestern
society (Bentham, 1789/1966). As a result, stakeholders’ concern
for morality may only drive stakeholders’ reactions when the
CSR directed at the environment is framed as targeted indirectly
to third parties that have a moral status in stakeholders’ eyes
(e.g., future generations, some animals). Future research should
test whether CSR directed at the environment indeed has a
lower heuristic, relational, and moral value than forms of CSR
that more directly involve human beings, against alternative
explanations. For example, it is possible that our participants
perceived CSR directed at suppliers in developing countries as
more morality-based or values-driven than CSR directed at the
environment, which could be perceived as more self-serving or
profit-driven given that in our vignettes this related to reducing
pollution andminimizing waste (Pandey et al., 2013;Willness and
Jones, 2013).
For the organizational justice field, our study provides
further evidence that CSR is a good setting to investigate
the drivers and impacts of justice perceptions and highlights
individual differences in this area. Research seeking to further
understand the different motives driving reactions to third-party
justice could use a CSR setting and experimental method to
disentangle the effects of the uncertainty reduction, relational,
and moral motives. Among others, building on our results
that trust mediates the relationship between CSR tradeoffs and
stakeholders’ responses, such work could study whether different
forms of trust have a stronger mediating effect on the justice-
behavior relationship for some motives than for others. We
would, for example, expect competence-based trust to be a
stronger mediator in relation to uncertainty reduction than in
relation to morality.
To managers facing the need to make tradeoffs, the
moderating effect of stakeholders’ other-orientation suggests that
which stakeholder group managers decide to give priority to
influences the type of stakeholders who will be attracted to the
firm. While stakeholders lower on other-orientation are more
likely to join firms that prioritize their own group, stakeholders
higher on other-orientation might avoid these firms if they feel
the advantages for themselves come at a high cost to other
stakeholders they care about. These self-selection effects may
impact firm performance in the longer term, as stakeholders
higher on other-orientation are likely to be more cooperative and
better citizens (Rioux and Penner, 2001; Bridoux and Stoelhorst,
2014; Hahn, 2015). Thus, in line with CSR scholars’ belief
that activities directed at secondary stakeholders matter, there
may be a win-win-win situation: a sweet spot where relatively
heavy investments toward a secondary stakeholder group (win)
translate in relational and moral value for primary stakeholders
higher on other-orientation (win) who are attracted and stay with
the firm because of such investments, which pays off for the firm
in the longer term (win) thanks to the stronger dedication of these
primary stakeholders to their relational partners.
Firms that aim to attract both stakeholders who are high and
those who are low on other-orientation could attempt to segment
their stakeholders on the basis of their level of other-orientation
in order to address their specific needs separately. Arguably, it is
what L’Oréal achieved with the acquisition of Body Shop in 2006.
With its focus on social and environmental welfare, Body Shop
had a culture and values that were very different from L’Oréal’s
and more appealing to customers and employees high on other-
orientation. A key success factor of this segmentation strategy
is probably that Body Shop continued to be run independently
from the UK, which isolates stakeholders’ perceptions of Body
Shop’s culture and values from decisions taken elsewhere in
L’Oréal. Observing that the firm makes decisions to deliver high
personal payoffs to stakeholders low on other-orientation may
lead stakeholders high on other-orientation to perceive other-
directed CSR as egoistic or as giving in to the pressure of
powerful stakeholder groups. Yet, to meet the relational and
moral needs of stakeholders high on other-orientation, it is
crucial that other-directed CSR is perceived by these stakeholders
as values-driven or altruistic to a significant extent (cf. Ellen
et al., 2006). Segmentation may be easier to realize for customers
than employees because employees may be more aware of the
connections between L’Oréal and Body Shop.
An alternative to segmentation would be to temporarily
activate a reciprocal or communal orientation in all their
stakeholders. This can be done by priming a more inclusive level
of identification in stakeholders who would otherwise have a
tendency to identify at the personal level as employee or customer
in an economic exchange. Specifically, even stakeholders who are
low on other-orientation can be brought to see other stakeholders
(1) as relational partners whose welfare matters to the self,
which corresponds to a reciprocal orientation, or (2) as members
of their own community, which corresponds to a communal
orientation (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, accepted). In particular,
when a communal orientation is primed in stakeholders, they
value CSR directed at other stakeholders as if it were CSR directed
at themselves (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, accepted). Managers can
prime a communal orientation using substantive and symbolic
management practices that help make a common identity salient,
e.g., socializing new employees with an emphasis on the common
identity, emphasizing stakeholders’ commonalities, and using
terms like “we” and “us” (rather than “you” and “I”) and phrases
like “we are a family” (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001). Priming a
more inclusive level of identification with such practices is more
likely to be successful with employees than customers.
Furthermore, our study suggests that trust is a key mechanism
through which tradeoffs impact stakeholders’ reactions: other-
directed CSRmay contribute to building trust in the organization
that help offset the negative impact of lower material benefits for
the stakeholders themselves, especially for stakeholders higher
on other-orientation. To leverage this mechanism, managers
of firms that invest in CSR activities could communicate to
groups that benefit less from these activities how the CSR
activities (a) relate to the firm’s values in order to enhance
stakeholders’ perceptions of the firm’s integrity, (b) improve the
firm’s relationships with its stakeholders in order to enhance
stakeholders’ perceptions of the firm’s benevolence, and (c) show
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the firm’s financial viability in order to enhance stakeholders’
perception of the firm’s ability.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Several future research directions stem from the limitation
of the present research. We used hypothetical vignettes to
manipulate the firm’s self- and other-directed CSR. Participants
were exposed to the firm’s record regarding CSR directed at two
stakeholder groups in quick succession. In reality, stakeholders
may encounter such information at different points in time.
Future research could investigate whether time intervals or
a different sequence between self- and other-directed CSR
would affect stakeholders’ behavioral reactions to tradeoffs.
The anchoring effect in human decision making (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974) suggests that the first piece of information
about a firm’s stakeholder management practices may have a
larger effect on stakeholders’ overall evaluation and reactions
than later pieces of information.
Our vignettes describe a consumer goods company (Wagner
et al., 2009). Reactions to tradeoffsmay vary across industries. For
example, stakeholders should be more sensitive to information
about CSR toward suppliers in industries where firms have
repeatedly been criticized for their bad treatment of suppliers
in developing countries (e.g., the apparel or food industry)
and less sensitive to the firm’s treatment of the environment
in industries where firms have a negligible influence on the
environment (e.g., services industries). In addition, as explained
above, to ensure that the vignette came across as sufficiently
realistic (Berens et al., 2007), we chose to describe the tradeoff
with low self-directed CSR as the firm scoring “slightly lower”
than major competitors. Future research could look into more
extreme tradeoffs. We expect such research to find a threshold
below which high other-directed CSR cannot compensate for low
self-directed CSR even for individuals high on other-orientation.
We also made the choice of describing the firm as doing
well financially because fairness assessments have been shown
to differ depending on whether the firm is making or losing
money: outsiders found it fairer to decrease CSR directed at
employees when the firm was losing money than when it was
doing well (Kahneman et al., 1986). It is not clear how, if
manipulated, this contextual factor would play out in the case of
tradeoffs.
As it is often the case in studies of stakeholders’ reactions
(e.g., Sen et al., 2006), the dependent variables were self-reported
intentions rather than actual behavior. A drawback of this is
that participants might realize that their reported intention does
not have actual consequences. To check the external validity
of these results, future research should study actual behavior
or at least control for respondents’ social desirability bias in
reporting intentions to associate with a firm. Using graduate
students recruited on several university campuses as participants
might also be viewed as a limitation. First, our results could
suffer from a selection bias as it may be that students higher
on other-orientation are more willing to fill in a survey. Second,
the generalizability of our findings can be questioned as all our
participants are young and highly educated and most of them
are Dutch. The Dutch culture, like most Western cultures, has
been qualified as individualistic, i.e., a culture where everyone is
supposed to take care of him- or her-self and the “I” dominates
over the “We” (Hofstede, 2001). The very limited cross-cultural
micro-CSR work published so far (e.g., Vlachos et al., 2014)
suggests that stakeholders react differently to tradeoffs involving
self- and other-directed CSR in highly collectivistic cultures.
In highly collectivistic cultures we expect other-orientation to
play a weaker moderating role when other-directed CSR targets
stakeholders that the respondent perceives as belonging his/her
ingroup because in such cultures the self is often defined at the
collective level, which implies that the pursuit of self-interest
coincides with the pursuit of the ingroup’s interest. In contrast,
for other-directed CSR targeted at stakeholders that are perceived
as members of outgroups, we would expect other-orientation to
play the same moderating role as in the present study.
To conclude, in line with Rupp and colleagues’ multimotive
framework, we found that stakeholders’ intention to associate
with a firm is not only influenced by self-directed CSR but
also by CSR targeted at other stakeholders. We added that
these effects take place in part through trust and depend on
stakeholders’ other-orientation. Our results further suggested
that the identity of the other stakeholder group matters: our
participants higher on other-orientation were more responsive
to CSR directed at suppliers in developing countries than at
the environment. Similarly to what Mitchell et al. (1997) have
done for stakeholders’ salience to managers, it seems important
to research which attributes and mechanisms make stakeholders
belonging to other groups salient and important to a focal
stakeholder.
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